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Abstract
In all the existing literature on survival in heterogeneous economies, the rate at which an
agent vanishes in the long run relative to another agent can be characterized by the difference
of the so-called survival indices, where each survival index only depends on the preferences of
the corresponding agent and the properties of the aggregate endowment. In particular, one agent
experiences extinction relative to another (that is, the wealth ratio of the two agents goes to zero)
if and only if she has a smaller survival index. We consider a simple complete market model and
show that the survival index is more complex if there are more than two agents in the economy. In
fact, the following phenomenon may take place: even if agent one experiences extinction relative
to agent two, adding a third agent to the economy may reverse the situation and force the agent
two to experience extinction relative to agent one. We also calculate the rates of convergence.
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1 Introduction
Long run survival of economic agents in competitive environments has been
extensively studied in many areas of economics, such as financial economics
(see e.g., Blume and Easley (1992, 2002, 2006, 2009a, 2009b)), firm compe-
tition (see e.g., Sjo¨stro¨m and Weitzman (1996)) and evolutionary games (see
e.g., Samuelson (1997)). As much as survival is important for understanding
the long run equilibrium behavior, it is equally important to understand how
quickly the non-surviving agents get extinct. If the rate of extinction is low,
they will impact equilibrium behavior for a long time. There is then a need
to study what happens during this time, before the agents get extinct. Do
they get extinct simultaneously or gradually, one after another? For example,
if the extinction of agent i relative to agent j is fast, agent j will still own a
large part of the market for a long time until he gets extinct relative to the
surviving agents. This raises the following important question: if we want to
know whether agent i dominates over j in the long run, can we consider them
in isolation? Is knowing the characteristics of the two agents sufficient for
answering the extinction question? The main goal of this paper is to provide
a simple example illustrating that, generally, the answer to this question is
”No.” In fact, we show that an “extinction reversal” may occur: even if agent i
experiences extinction relative to agent j, adding a new agent to the economy
may reverse the situation and force agent j to experience extinction relative
to agent i.
We believe that the phenomenon of extinction reversal is of fundamental
importance for understanding survival of heterogeneous agents. While our
goal is only to construct an example of extinction reversal, we think that this
phenomenon is quite universal and should occur in many models of competitive
behavior and has important implications for studying long-run competition.
Suppose, for example, that we are analyzing competition of firms in a market
and we want to know which firms will dominate in the long run. Typically,
economic models addressing this question assume that there are only two firms
in the economy (see, e.g., Kogan, Ross, Wang and Westerfield (2006)). Our
results indicate that the question cannot be answered without studying what
other firms are present in the market, because their presence may lead to
extinction reversal.
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The main ingredients responsible for the occurrence of extinction reversal
in our model are: (1) the fact that the allocation is Pareto-efficient and (2) the
fact that the agents are maximizing utility only from wealth (consumption)
at the terminal time T .∗ Under these conditions, there are two effects that
drive the equilibrium terminal wealth of an agent: the wealth allocation effect
and the welfare weight effect. The wealth allocation effect determines how the
agent allocates wealth across the states of the world. This is an agent-specific
effect and it does not depend on the characteristics of other agents in the
economy. It is determined by the agent’s characteristics such as risk attitude,
beliefs and production technology. By contrast, the welfare weight effect is
of a completely different nature. Since the allocation is Pareto-efficient, there
exist welfare weights such that the equilibrium allocation maximizes a linear
combination of all the agents’ utilities, multiplied with these weights. How-
ever, these weights are determined endogenously in equilibrium and depend
on the characteristics of all the agents in the economy, as well as on the ter-
minal horizon T. In particular, as the horizon T increases, the rate at which
the welfare weight of an agent in the economy is changing with T will depend
on the characteristics of other agents. Therefore, the rates of relative extinc-
tion of two agents will also depend on the parameters of other agents in the
economy.
In our example we consider an economy populated by two agents who only
differ in their risk aversions and show that the agent whose preference are
closest to that of a log agent (an agent with constant relative risk aversion
equal to one) dominates in the long run and the other agent gets extinct.
Now, suppose that we add a third agent to the economy whose preferences
are closer to the log agent than those of the two other agents. Then, in the
long run, only the third agent survives and owns the whole economy. As the
horizon increases, the impact of the third agent on the total welfare grows
∗The assumption of no intermediate consumption is often used in the literature on sur-
vival. See e.g. Amir, Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe (2005). It allows us to concen-
trate on the effects of capital accumulation. We get our results sending T to infinity, which
should be interpreted through the extinction rates, explicitly derived in our paper: if the
extinction of i relative to j takes place at rate ρ, it means that, effectively, if the horizon T
is larger than ρ−1, the market share of agent i is negligible relative to that of agent j.
and, consequently, the long run behavior of equilibrium welfare weights is
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strongly affected by the third agent. We calculate the exact effect of the third
agent on the rates of extinction of the other two agents and determine the set
of parameters for which extinction reversal occurs. More precisely, the risk
aversions of the two agents must be on the different sides of one, and the risk
aversion of the third agent must be sufficiently close to one, at a distance not
more than the geometric mean of the risk aversions of the other two agents.
We now discuss the related literature. It has become a conventional wis-
dom that, with no intermediate consumption, the agent with logarithmic util-
ity of terminal wealth will have the highest wealth growth rate and thus will
eventually dominate in the long run. See, e.g., Rubinstein (1991), Blume and
Easley (1992), Kogan, Ross, Wang and Westerfield (2006). One consequence
of our results is that the agent whose preferences are the closest to logarithmic
dominates in the long run.†
Most of the existing literature on survival studies the case when the agents
maximize utility of intertemporal consumption. Blume and Easley (2009b) is
an excellent survey of the existing results. The main general feature of all
equilibrium survival models with intermediate consumption is that the long
run survival of each agent is characterized by a single number, the “survival
index,” that depends only the agent’s characteristics. The first result of this
kind has been discovered by Sandroni (2000). He showed that, when markets
are complete, the economy is bounded and all agents have identical discount
factors, then an agent’s survival index is given by the entropy of his subjective
probability measure relative to the true probability measure. In particular,
only the agents with the smallest entropy survive. Blume and Easley (2006)
extended the results of Sandroni, allowing for very general learning mecha-
nisms and heterogeneous discount rates. They showed that the survival result
holds in any Pareto optimal allocation in any bounded economy, and thus for
any complete markets equilibrium. For bounded complete markets economies
there is a survival index that determines which traders survive, which traders
vanish, and also determines the rates of relative extinction of different traders.
†We only consider the case when all agents have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
utilities. The results can be extended to the case of general utilities (see Cvitanic´ and Mala-
mud (2009a)), but the analysis gets substantially more technical and we confine ourselves
to the CRRA case for the reader’s convenience.
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This index depends only on the agent’s characteristics and exogenous state
variables, namely, the agent’s discount factor, the actual stochastic process of
the states and the agent’s beliefs about this stochastic process. Interestingly
enough, for these economies, attitudes toward risk do not matter for survival.
They also show that the market selects the traders who learn the true process
over those who do not learn the truth, the Bayesians with the true value in the
support of their prior over comparable non-Bayesians, and among Bayesians
according to the dimension of the support of their prior (assuming that the
true value is in the support). However, Blume and Easley (2006) provide
only necessary conditions for survival. Blume and Easley (2009a) consider
a special case of the Blume and Easley (2006) model when the agents have
heterogeneous beliefs, but do not learn. They provide a detailed study of the
case when there are multiple agents with equal maximal survival indices and
show which of them do, indeed, survive in the long run. Yan (2009) shows
that risk preferences matter when the economy is unbounded. Similarly to
Blume and Easley (2006), he shows that survival and extinction of each agent
is characterized by a survival index but this index depends on the agent’s risk
aversion. The conclusion is that in the models with intermediate consump-
tion and complete markets, extinction reversal cannot occur because relative
extinction is independent of the characteristics of other agents. The reason
is that, with intermediate consumption and complete markets, the welfare
weight effect is absent: the horizon is infinite from the beginning and the wel-
fare weights are fixed. Thus, long run wealth dynamics are determined by two
allocation effects: allocation across states and allocation across time periods.
These effects are determined by the agent’s beliefs, discount rate and elasticity
of intertemporal substitution, and are not affected by the parameters of other
agents in the economy.
Little is known about survival when markets are incomplete. Sandroni
(2005) shows that in markets with an incomplete set of Arrow securities an
agent’s survival and relative extinction depend only on the agent’s characteris-
tics (namely, the entropy of his beliefs relative to the true probability measure)
and thus the result of Blume and Easley still holds. However, for multi-period
incomplete markets, the situation is more complicated (see Blume and Easley
(2009b) for a survey of existing results). The reason is that equilibrium allo-
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cations are not Pareto efficient and welfare weights are stochastic and evolve
through time. Thus, the welfare weight effect is present in incomplete mar-
kets with intermediate consumption: in the long run, the dominant agents will
have higher weights and will impact relative extinction of other agents and
may potentially lead to extinction reversal. We leave this interesting problem
for future research.
Blume and Easley (2002) consider a different survival problem. They ad-
dress the famous conjecture of Milton Friedman that only the profit-maximizing
firms should survive in the long run. They consider a deterministic dynamic
equilibrium model with firms that use their retained earnings for investment
and show that, indeed, only the profit-maximizing firms survive. However,
surprisingly, the long-run state of the evolutionary process is inefficient. In
contrast to our paper, Blume and Easley (2002) do not study relative extinc-
tion. In the first part of the paper, they do not allow capitalists (the firm
owners) to trade in the financial markets and show that the profit maximizing
capitalists always survive. However, it is not clear from their analysis which of
the capitalists will disappear faster and how quickly (i.e., at which rate) this
extinction will happen. In the second part of the paper, they study the case
when capitalists can reallocate capital between firms by trading in financial
markets. However, they do not derive general results for survival/extinction,
but present several examples indicating that even capitalists with incorrect
beliefs may dominate in the long run. However, their examples only deal with
the case of two capitalists and it is thus unclear how the presence of more
than two capitalists in the market affects their relative extinction.
The literature discussed above addresses exclusively the “preference-based”
approach to survival. Alternatively, one could study survival when investors
follow rules exhibiting particular behaviors. Amir, Evstigneev, Hens, and
Schenk-Hoppe (2005) and Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe (2006) con-
sider general one-period markets and study whether there are simple portfolio
rules that survive in the long run, or are evolutionarily stable, when the mar-
ket is populated by other simple portfolio rules. A simple rule is one for which
the fraction of wealth invested in a given asset is independent of the cur-
rent asset prices. In this research, either all the winnings are invested (which
corresponds to the no intermediate consumption case of our model), or equiv-
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alently the traders are assumed to invest an equal fraction of their winnings
and consumption rates are the same for all traders. Thus, market selection
depends only on portfolio rules and not on the agent’s wealth allocation needs
across states and time periods. Amir, Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe
(2005) show that the trader who allocates his wealth across assets accord-
ing to their conditional expected relative payoffs dominates in the long run.
Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe (2006) show that the expected relative
payoffs rule is evolutionarily stable using notions of stability from evolutionary
game theory. Amir, Evstigneev, Hens and Xu (2009) extend this analysis in a
game-theoretic framework and allow for general, adaptive strategies (portfolio
rules), distributing their wealth between assets, depending on the exogenous
states of the world and the observed history of the game.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
defines the equilibrium allocation. Section 3 contains the main results – the
expressions for the rates of extinction and conditions for extinction reversal.
Section 4 concludes and the proofs are delegated to Appendix.
2 Setup and notation
2.1 The model
We consider a standard setting analogous to that of Wang (1996), except there
is only a terminal dividend. The economy has a finite horizon and evolves in
continuous time. Uncertainty is described by a one-dimensional, standard
Brownian motion Bt, t ∈ [0 , T ] on a complete probability space (Ω,FT , P ),
where F is the augmented filtration generated by Bt. There is a single share
of a risky asset in the economy, the stock, which pays a terminal dividend
payment
D = DT = e
ρT + σBT .
We also assume that a risk-free asset with instantaneous constant rate r is
available in zero net supply.‡ The price of the stock at time t is denoted by
‡The existence of an instantaneously risk-free security is a common assumption in equi-
librium literature (see, e.g., Wang (1996)). When time is discrete, it is commonly assumed
that a one-period risk free bond is available for trading. In the continuous time limit,
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St. The instantaneous drift and volatility of the stock price St are denoted by
µt and σt respectively,
dSt
St
= µtdt + σtdBt.
There are K competitive agents in the economy, who behave rationally, and
are heterogeneous in risk preferences. Agent k is initially endowed with ψk
shares of the stock at time zero, and we have∑
k
ψk = 1.
Agent k chooses portfolio strategy pikt, the portfolio weight in the risky asset,
so as to maximize the CRRA expected utility
E
[
W 1−γkkT
1− γk
]
of final wealth WkT , where the wealth Wkt evolves as
dWkt = Wkt(rdt + pikt (S
−1
t dSt − rdt)).
Remark 2.1. All the results of the paper can be directly extended to the
case of agents having heterogeneous beliefs on the expected return rate of
the endowment (as, e.g., in Sandroni (2000), Blume and Easley (2006) and
Yan (2009)), and to utility functions generalizing CRRA utilities. However,
the analysis for the latter becomes much more technical, and the details are
available from the authors upon request.
2.2 The equilibrium
Definition 2.1. We say that the market is in equilibrium if the agents behave
optimally and both the risky asset market and the risk-free market clear.
It is well known that the above financial market is complete if the volatility
process σt of the stock price is almost everywhere strictly positive. See Duffie
the one-period bonds become instantaneously risk-free. The assumption of constant r is
introduced only for simplicity of exposition.
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(2001, Chapter 6).§ When the market is complete, there exists a unique
stochastic discount factor (SDF) M = MT such that the stock price is given
by
St = e
r(t−T ) Et[MD]
Et[M ]
.
The quantity M/Et[M ] is often referred to as the Arrow-Debreu state price
density. Namely, when the state space is discrete, with state s occurring with
probability ps, we can construct Arrow securities that pay 1 in state s and
zero otherwise. By market completeness, Arrow securities can be replicated
by trading in the existing securities (stock and bonds). Consequently, holding
an asset paying the dividend ds in state s is equivalent to holding a bundle of
Arrow securities, and the price P of this asset coincides with the price of the
bundle,
P =
∑
s
ds Πs
where Πs is the price of the Arrow security for state s. The vector M =
(ms) = (Πs/ps) is referred to as the state price density. It allows us to write
the pricing formula as
P = E[M D].
This expression directly extends to the case of a continuous state space. In
that case Arrow-Debreu state prices are not defined, but the state price density
is well defined. Since the markets are complete, the agent can trade either in
the directly available assets or in Arrow securities. The market equilibrium in
which agents trade in Arrow securities is called an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.
When the state space is discrete (continuous), an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium
is characterized by the equilibrium state prices (the state price density).
Consequently, in our model, because of market completeness, the equi-
librium allocation is Pareto-efficient and can be characterized as an Arrow-
Debreu equilibrium.¶ See, e.g. Duffie (1986), Wang (1996). Because the
§It is not difficult to see from standard arguments that the stock price is strictly monotone
increasing in Wt and hence the volatility is strictly positive. In fact, it is possible to show
(see, Cvitanic´ and Malamud (2009b)) that the stock price volatility is always larger than
the dividend volatility.
¶It should be mentioned that the market in our setting is dynamically complete, so that
the Arrow securities can be replicated by dynamic rather that static portfolios.
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endowments are co-linear (all agents hold shares of the same single stock), the
equilibrium is in fact unique, up to a multiplicative factor, and unique if we
fix the risk-free rate. See, e.g., Dana (1995), Dana (2001).‖
Due to market completeness, an agent’s optimal wealth can be calcu-
lated directly through the Arrow-Debreu state prices (the state price density).
Given agent k’s financial wealth Wk 0 at time zero, the agent can attain any
contingent claim WT satisfying the budget constraint
E[MT WT ] ≤ Wk 0.
Thus, agent k is maximizing
E[uk(Wk T )] − λk (E[MT Wk T ] − Wk 0)
where λk is the Lagrange multiplier and uk(x) = x
1−γk/(1 − γk) is the
agent’s utility. The first order condition immediately implies that the optimal
terminal wealth is of the form
WkT = (λkM)
−bk
where
bk = γ
−1
k
is the relative risk tolerance of agent k, and λk is determined via the budget
constraint
E[(λkM)
−bkM ] = Wk0 = ψk S0 = ψk E[DM ].
We formalize our findings in
Proposition 2.1. The equilibrium allocation is given by
WkT =
ψk E[DM ]
E[M1−bk ]
M−bk
‖Since the endowment is neither bounded away from zero nor from infinity, some ad-
ditional care is needed to show the existence of equilibrium. See, e.g., Dana (2001) and
Malamud (2008a).
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and the equilibrium SDF M solves the equation
∑
k
ψk E[DM ]
E[M1−bk ]
M−bk = D. (1)
3 Relative extinction
Definition 3.2. We say that a function f(T ) converges to zero almost at rate
ρ > 0 as T →∞ if for any  > 0 there exist constants K1(), K2() such that
K1() e
−(ρ+)T ≤ f(T ) ≤ K2() e−(ρ−)T
for all T ≥ 0.
We will also need the following
Definition 3.3. We say that agent i experiences extinction relative to agent
j if
lim
T→∞
WiT
WjT
= 0
almost surely.
We start with the following result, the first part of which confirms the
intuition of Rubinstein (1991).
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that there exists a unique agent 0 such that ∗∗
(1− γ0)2 = min
k
(1− γk)2.
Then,
WkT
W0T
→ 0
for all k 6= 0 and the convergence happens almost at rate −sk with
sk
def
= bk (−(1− γk)2 + (1− γ0)2) < 0 .
∗∗The assumption is true for generic values of risk aversion. On the other hand, if there
are two agents equally distant from the log, they will both survive and share the economy
in the long run.
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We call sk the survival index of agent k. Theorem 3.1 shows that this
index determines how quickly an agent gets extinct relative to agent 0 closest
to the log agent, and that the rate of extinction is influenced by two effects:
(i) the distance of the agent’s risk aversion from risk aversion 1 relative to
that distance for the single surviving agent 0; (ii) the agent’s risk tolerance.
The first effect is intuitive: if the agent is far away from the log agent in
terms of risk aversion, the long-run growth rate of his wealth is small and,
consequently, his survival index is also small. The appearance of risk tolerance
bk multiplying the “distance” −(1 − γk)2 + (1 − γ0)2 of agent k from agent
0 is a new and unexpected effect. Intuitively, small risk tolerance (large risk
aversion) diminishes the effect of the “distance” from the log because the agent
takes safe positions in the stock, investing more into the bonds, so that his
wealth fluctuations are smaller. In contrast, when his risk tolerance is large,
the agent takes risky positions, his wealth fluctuates more, and thus the effect
of the distance factor gets magnified.
Writing down
WiT
WjT
=
WiT/W0T
WjT/W0T
,
Theorem 3.1 implies
Corollary 3.1. An agent i experiences extinction relative to agent j if and
only if
si < sj
and WiT/WjT converges to zero almost at rate sj − si.
The results of Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.1 are crucial for understanding
the nature of extinction and survival. We are particularly interested in the
phenomenon of extinction reversal. Namely, we say that an extinction reversal
occurs if the order in which the agents i and j get extinct in the multiple agent
economy is reverse to that in the economy in which only agents i and j are
present.
As we mention in the introduction, in all the existing literature on sur-
vival in heterogeneous economies with intermediate consumption, the rate at
which agent i vanishes in the long run relative to agent j depends only on
11
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the preferences of the corresponding agent and the properties of the aggregate
endowment. Theorem 3.1 shows that this is not true in our model: the rate
depends on the risk aversion γ0 of the surviving agent.
We will now formulate necessary and sufficient conditions for extinction
reversal. A direct calculation shows that
sj − si = γi − γj
γiγj
(
γiγj − 1 + (1− γ0)2
)
. (2)
In particular, if γi > γj > 1, we get sj > si. Similarly, if γi < γj < 1, we have
(1− γ0)2 < (1− γi)2 < 1− γi < 1− γiγj
and we again get sj > si. Thus, if the risk aversions of agents i and j are on
the same side of 1, the relative extinction does not depend on the presence
of agent 0 – the agent further away from the risk aversion of 1 gets extinct
relative to the other agent. If γi > 1 > γj but γi γj > 1 then we also get
sj > si. Suppose now that γj > 1 > γi but γi γj < 1. Then, in an economy
populated by agents i and j only, agent j will dominate in the long run if and
only if γj − 1 < 1− γi. In this case, a direct calculation shows that
(γj − 1)2 < 1− γiγj.
Therefore, introducing a new surviving agent in the economy will not lead to
extinction reversal. Indeed, the inequality (1−γ0)2 < (1−γj)2 < 1−γiγj and
(2) imply that sj > si. Thus, we can only get extinction reversal if γi − 1 >
1 − γj > 0 and the quantity in the brackets on the right hand side of (2) is
negative. We formalize our findings in
Corollary 3.2. Let γj < 1 and suppose that γi > 2− γj and γi γj < 1. Then
agent i experiences extinction relative to agent j in the economy populated
only by agents i and j. On the other hand, if we also have
γ0 ∈
(
1 −√1− γiγj , 1 + √1− γiγj) (3)
then extinction reversal occurs in any economy in which all three agents i, j
and 0 are present, irrespective of the risk aversions of other agents. These
conditions are both necessary and sufficient.
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As we explain in the introduction, there are two effects determining the
size of the agent’s wealth: the wealth allocation effect and the welfare weight
effect. Agent k’s wealth is given by
Wk T = M
−bk ψk E[DM ]
E[M1−bk ]
.
The long run behavior of the part M−bk is driven by the wealth allocation
effect. More precisely, the risk tolerance bk determines how the agent allocates
his wealth across states. If the risk aversion is high, risk tolerance is low and
the agent hedges against “bad” states with low consumption and puts a lot
of weight on them. That is, effectively, the agent bets on the realization of
bad states. By contrast, if the agent’s risk aversion is low, he is willing to
take on more risks, buys more stock and, effectively, bets on the realization
of “good” states with high consumption. The log agent is exactly “in the
middle” between the very risk averse and very risk tolerant agents and bets
on “average” (not too good and not too bad states). This wealth allocation
rule leads to optimal wealth growth. The constant factor zk =
ψk E[DM ]
E[M1−bk ] comes
from the welfare weight effect. Its long run behavior depends in a nontrivial
way on the characteristics of other agents in the economy. When the horizon
T is large, the impact of the surviving agent 0 of this factor becomes large
and affects the extinction rate of agent k. In the framework of Corollary 3.2
this effect is particularly strong. The reason is as follows. When only two
agents i and j are present in the economy, agent j dominates because his risk
aversion is closer to 1 and, for this reason, he has a higher growth rate of
his wealth. In particular, the state price density MT behaves asymptotically
as D
−γj
T , i.e., as if agent i were not present in the economy. However, in the
presence of agent 0, state price density MT behaves asymptotically as D
−γ0
T
and is therefore more volatile (because γ0 > γj). Agent j, being less risk averse
than γ0, invests a larger portion of his wealth into stock, which also makes his
wealth very volatile and makes him dominated by agent 0 faster than agent
i. The latter is more risk averse than agent 0, invests less into stock and has
therefore a less volatile wealth process.
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0 is very close to being logarithmic, survival indices of other agents in the
economy will become small and he will quickly own the whole economy. His
presence will then lead to dramatic changes in prices, and make the strategy
of more risk averse agent i “better” relative to that of less risk averse agent
j. In effect, a greater part of the utility welfare of agent j than that of agent
i has been taken over by agent 0. On the other hand, in infinite horizon
models with intermediate consumption and complete markets, the analog of
the constant factor zk does not depend on T and so the welfare weight effect
is absent, and extinction reversal cannot occur.
4 Conclusions
In a complete market model with CRRA agents maximizing utility from ter-
minal wealth only, we show that the agent whose relative risk aversion is
closest to the log agent is the only surviving agent, asymptotically, as the
horizon tends to infinity. We find the rate at which other agents get extinct
and show that this rate depends on the agent’s risk tolerance and on how far
away the agent is from the log agent relative to how far away is the surviving
agent from the log agent. Because the surviving agent’s risk aversion affects
how fast other agents get extinct, it is possible to have extinction reversal:
if a new agent is added to an economy of two agents, in this new economy
the agent who originally gets extinct may survive longer than the originally
surviving agent. This phenomenon cannot happen in complete markets with
agents maximizing utility from consumption over infinite horizon. On the
other hand, it would be of considerable interest to study similar phenomena
in incomplete markets.
Put differently, Condition (3) requires that γ0 be very close to 1. If agent
14
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 10 [2010], Iss. 1 (Contributions), Art. 4
http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol10/iss1/art4
Appendix
A Proofs
When risk aversion is homogeneous across agents, the equilibrium SDF is
explicitly determined by D−γ/E[D−γ]. However, when risk aversion is hetero-
geneous, the SDF is the solution to highly non-linear equation (1), and no
explicit solution is possible, except for some very special values of risk aver-
sion; see, for example, Wang (1996). In the lemma below, we establish bounds
on the equilibrium SDF.
Lemma A.1. Let Γ ≥ 1 be such that Γ bi > 1 for all i and γ ≤ 1 be such that
γbi ≤ 1 for all i. Then,(∑
i
D−γi/γ
(
ψiE[DM ]/E[M
1−bi ]
)γi/γ)γ
≤ M ≤
(∑
i
D−γi/Γ
(
ψiE[DM ]/E[M
1−bi ]
)γi/Γ)Γ . (4)
Quantity D−γi
(
ψiE[DM ]/E[M
1−bi ]
)γi can be viewed as the “individual”
SDF in an economy populated only by agent i. It is known that, when risk
aversion is heterogeneous, the equilibrium SDF can be represented as a gener-
alized weighted Ho¨lder average of the “individual” SDFs (see, e.g., Malamud
(2008a), Malamud (2008b), Jouini and Napp (2008), Shefrin (2005)). Lemma
A.1 shows that M can be estimated from both below and above by Ho¨lder
averages with different exponents γ and Γ.
Proof of Lemma A.1: Let
zi = ψiE[DM ]/E[M
1−bi ] .
Then, the equilibrium equation is∑
i
ziM
−bi = D.
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Suppose that
M >
(∑
i
D−γi/Γ zγi/Γi
)Γ
.
Then,
∑
i
ziM
−bi D−1 <
∑
i
zi
(∑
i
D−γi/Γ zγi/Γi
)−Γ /γi
=
∑
i
(
D−γi/Γzγi/Γi∑
i D
−γi/Γ zγi/Γi
)Γ /γi
. (5)
Since Γ > γi for all i, we get(
D−γi/Γzγi/Γi∑
i D
−γi/Γ zγi/Γi
)Γ /γi
<
D−γi/Γzγi/Γi∑
i D
−γi/Γ zγi/Γi
and therefore ∑
i
ziM
−bi D−1 <
∑
i
D−γi/Γzγi/Γi∑
i D
−γi/Γ zγi/Γi
= 1
which is a contradiction. The estimate from below follows by the same argu-
ment.
The weights
(
ψiE[DM ]/E[M
1−bi ]
)γi are not directly helpful for getting
useful bounds for M. The following useful lemma allows us to obtain uni-
form bounds for these weights. It has a very clear economic meaning: the
maximal utility of an agent is larger than the utility from simply consuming
its endowment, and is smaller than the utility from consuming the aggregate
endowment of the economy.
Lemma A.2. Let M be the equilibrium SDF. If γi < 1 then
1 ≤ E[DM ]
1−γi E[M1−bi ]γi
E[D1−γi ]
≤ ψγi−1i .
If γi > 1 then
ψγi−1i ≤
E[DM ]1−γi E[M1−bi ]γi
E[D1−γi ]
≤ 1.
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Proof: The utility of agent i’s optimal wealth is given by
1
1− γi E[W
1−γi
iT ] =
1
1− γiψ
1−γi
i
(
E[DM ]
E[M1−bi ]
)1−γi
E[M1−bi ]
=
1
1− γiψ
1−γi
i E[DM ]
1−γi E[M1−bi ]γi . (6)
The utility from just consuming its endowment (the terminal dividend of its
initial portfolio) is
1
1− γi E[(ψiD)
1−γi ] =
1
1− γiψ
1−γi
i E[D
1−γi ].
Furthermore, by definition, in equilibrium we must have WiT ≤ D and
therefore
1
1− γi E[(ψiD)
1−γi ] ≤ 1
1− γi E[W
1−γi
iT ] ≤
1
1− γi E[D
1−γi ] .
Multiplying both sides by 1− γi and using (6), we get the result.
Lemmas A.1 and A.2 together will allow us to obtain good bounds on the
ratio WiT/WjT .
Lemma A.3. There exist constants K1, K2 > 0 such that
K1
∑
i
E[DM ]
E[D1−γi ]
D−γi ≤ M ≤ K2
∑
i
E[DM ]
E[D1−γi ]
D−γi .
Proof: By Lemma A.1,
1
n
∑
i
D−γi
(
ψiE[DM ]/E[M
1−bi ]
)γi ≤ M
≤ n
∑
i
D−γi
(
ψiE[DM ]/E[M
1−bi ]
)γi . (7)
By Lemma A.2,
K1
E[DM ]
E[D1−γi ]
≤ (ψiE[DM ]/E[M1−bi ])γi ≤ K2 E[DM ]
E[D1−γi ]
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for some K1, K2 > 0. The proof is complete.
We will also need the following
Lemma A.4. For any α > 0 and any xi > 0,
min{nα−1, 1}
∑
i
xαi ≤
(∑
i
xi
)α
≤ max{nα−1, 1}
∑
i
xαi .
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let first γi > γ0. By Lemma A.2,
Kˆ2 ≤ WiT/W0TE[D1−γ0 ]b0
E[D1−γi ]bi E[DM ]
bi−b0M b0−bi
≤ Kˆ1.
for some Kˆ1, Kˆ2 > 0. Combining Lemmas A.3 and A.4, we get that
K˜2 ≤ M
b0−bi∑
k
E[DM ]b0−bi D(bi−b0)γk
E[D1−γk ]b0−bi
≤ K˜1.
and therefore WiT/W0T converges to zero almost at the same rate as
∑
k
E[D1−γ0 ]b0 D(bi−b0)γk
E[D1−γi ]biE[D1−γk ]b0−bi
=
∑
k
e
1
2
σ2 T ((1−γ0)2b0−(1−γi)2bi−(1−γk)2(b0−bi)+2σ−1 γk(bi−b0)BT /T). (8)
Since, by assumption, bi = γ
−1
i < γ
−1
0 = b0,
max
k
{(1− γ0)2b0 − (1− γi)2bi − (1− γk)2(b0 − bi) }
= (1− γ0)2b0 − (1− γi)2bi − (1− γ0)2(b0 − bi) = si (9)
and the claim follows since, by the strong law of large numbers for the Brow-
nian motion, BT/T → 0 almost surely.
Finally, if γi < γ0, we can repeat the same argument and show that
WiT/W0T → 0 almost at rate −si, which is what had to be proved.
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